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ABSTRACT 
Applying a New Legal Realist framework, this chapter uses the insurance field as a pathway for 
exploring how insurance institutions shape law in formal and informal settings.  Consistent with 
new institutional organizational sociology studies that highlight how organizations influence the 
meaning of compliance, I show how the insurance field, largely through a lens anchored around 
risk, filters and mediates what law means through a risk-based logic.  I begin by explaining how 
insurance exerts a regulatory force over its subjects and acts as a form of governance beyond the 
state.  Next, I show how the presence of liability insurance often shapes how civil lawsuits are 
structured.  I then pivot to the criminal justice system where risk assessment and actuarial 
techniques increasingly are used to categorize criminals with varying degrees of dangerousness.  I 
then show how risk management now permeates and influences how many judges operate in 
various problem-solving courts.  Finally, I reveal the processes and mechanisms through which 
insurer risk management techniques influence how organizations understand law and compliance.  
I conclude this chapter by noting that the insurance field’s shaping of law in formal and informal 
settings can have both positive and negative impacts for achieving access to justice.   
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Planet of the Insurers: How Insurers Shape and Influence Law and Impact Access to 
Justice 
 New Legal Realism encompasses a number of distinct qualities, including multi- and 
interdisciplinarity, an openness to multiple methods, and a clear acknowledgment of the 
importance of theory in law and social science.  An outgrowth of the law and society movement, 
NLR emphasizes the social context of law and seeks to develop approaches that account for how 
law actually works in action.  Another additional defining feature of NLR—and slightly different 
than the law and society movement—is that NLR is focused on how to translate social science to 
law and lawyers as opposed to just the social science of law (Talesh, Mertz & Klug Ch. 1, 
forthcoming 2020).  NLR also takes seriously the importance of formal legal institutions and the 
interaction between top down and bottom up constructions of law.  Within this interaction are 
rule or legal intermediaries, i.e., state, business, and civil society actors that affect, control or 
monitor how legal rules are interpreted, implemented or constructed once they are passed by 
public legal institutions (Talesh and Pelisse 2019).  Legal intermediaries are the key actors on the 
chain between formal legal institutions and informal constructions of law.  Legal and non-legal 
actors rely on their professional experience, institutional logics, services and products that they 
offer, and understandings of law and compliance to facilitate and inhibit social change in 
different situations.   
 Drawing from this NLR framework, this chapter focuses on how insurers act as legal 
intermediaries that shape and influence law and legal institutions and impact access to justice. 
Insurance, insurance risk management techniques, and more broadly, “risk” concepts, shape 
society.  Insurance (1) reframes how we conceptualize fairness and justice, (2) acts as a 
disciplining instrument by shaping behavior and expectations, and (3) reshapes the state through 
a definition of its limits, responsibilities, and missions. Although statistics, actuarial tables, and 
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other insurance instruments allow insurers to define, classify, and categorize groups, the rising 
use of algorithms and big data allow insurers to more easily individually identify and cover risks.  
These changes and features of insurance identified impact collective life in important ways.   
In the shadow of insurance, impacting society across a wide variety of dimensions, is 
law.  Legal institutions play an important role as well. Courts interpret the meaning of insurance 
policies, statutes establish what social insurance and other public sector insurance arrangements 
are permitted, and insurance regulations attempt to enforce state insurance laws, promulgate 
rules and regulations, and conduct hearings to resolve disputed matters pertaining to insurance. 
Private insurance arrangements in particular depend on a well-defined and robust contract law 
and a regulated market.    
But less explored is how the insurance field influences legal institutions and law more 
generally.  Law shapes and influences what insurance means while the law is simultaneously 
influenced by insurance.  I argue that two conditions help create an environment where insurers 
are more likely to influence law and legal institutions.  First, although state and federal 
governments regulate many areas, there are still significant areas that are under or unregulated.  
Thus, insurers fill in this space with policy language that steers individuals and organizations 
toward regulatory goals.  Second, laws regulating organizations are often ambiguous in how they 
define compliance.  Insurers, often acting as de facto regulators, have tremendous space to shape 
the meaning of law and compliance for organizations.  Insurance institutions are influencing law 
and legal institutions and society.   
This chapter starts with a basic premise that risk, as an ideological principle, and risk 
management, as a particularized technique, are templates through which we govern society and 
influence legal institutions (Baker and Simon 2002).  Acting as an intermediary, the insurance 
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field, including but not limited to, insurance companies, administrators, brokers, risk managers, 
filter what law and compliance means through a risk-based logic and frame the legal 
environment in terms of risk (Talesh 2015a).  In doing so, the insurance field shapes and 
influences law and legal institutions.   
The following explains how the insurance field shapes and influences not just legal 
institutions but also formal law.  Largely drawing from new institutional theories of law and 
organizations, a body of research has developed over the past thirty years that articulates how 
institutionalized conceptions of law and compliance initially become widely accepted within 
organizations and eventually institutionalized as they come to be seen as legitimate and rational 
by public legal institutions like courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies (Edelman 2016; 
Talesh 2009).  Unlike an exogenous approach, law is seen as part of an endogenous process in 
which the content and meaning of law and compliance is shaped by private organizations, the 
very group such laws are designed to regulate (Edelman 2016).  Whereas initial studies in this 
vein focused on how managerial values shaped the way employers understand law and 
compliance and ultimately led to courts deferring to employer interpretations of compliance, I 
extend and refine “legal endogeneity” theory to areas outside the civil rights context.1  In 
                                                          
1 Initial research on organizational constructions of law, led largely by Lauren Edelman, laid a 
foundation for scholars to continue elaborating the relationship between law and organizational 
compliance.  Scholars have moved in different directions and are exploring various aspects of 
how organizations construct legal meaning and compliance.  Both within and outside the United 
States, scholars have explored the ways organizations construct the content and meaning of laws 
that are designed to regulate them in consumer regulation (Talesh 2009, 2012b, 2013, 2014); 
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insurance (Schneiberg 2005; Talesh 2015a,b); welfare regulation (Covaleski, Dirsmith, and 
Weiss 2013); insider trader laws (Bozanic, Dirsmith and Huddart 2012); prison rape regulation 
(Jenness and Smyth 2011); school sexual harassment policies (Short 2006); restaurant hygiene 
regulation (Lehman, Kovacs, and Carroll 2014); privacy (Pandy 2013); cybersecurity (Talesh 
2018), the medical education field (Dunn and Jones 2010); employers’ use of criminal 
background checks (Lageson, Vulo, and Uggen 2014); financial derivatives (Krawiec 2003, 
2005; Holder-Webb and Cohen 2012; Funk and Hirschman 2014); antitrust in the film industry 
(Mezias and Boyle 2005); tax incentives for employer-sponsored childcare (Kelly 2003); 
international environmental management standards (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011); tax 
regulation (Mulligan and Oats forthcoming); Canadian wrongful dismissal doctrine (Nierobisz 
2010); Australian labor law (Frazer 2014); and British financial service regulation (Gilad 2014).  
For the most part, studies of organizational construction of law have explored particular aspects 
of legal endogeneity theory.  In particular, many of these studies analyze particular aspects of 
legal endogeneity, such as the development of symbolic compliance or the manner in which legal 
institutions follow norms and practices developed within organizations.  However, others have 
explored the entire cycle of legal endogeneity and in doing so, extended and refined the theory of 
legal endogeneity to go beyond how organizations influence the meaning of judicial decisions as 
demonstrated in the EEO context (Talesh 2009, 2012, 2014, 2015a,b).  These studies broaden the 
range of mechanisms through which organizations shape legal meaning.  In doing so, these 
studies of legal endogeneity expand the web of scholars that can potentially use and apply the 
theory across multiple disciplines beyond the original framework. 
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particular, I show how the insurance field constructs the meaning of law and compliance.  
Moreover, I show how other logics beyond managerial values can influence the way actors 
within organizational fields understand law and compliance (Talesh 2015a,b, 2018).  In 
particular, the insurance field, largely through a lens anchored around risk, filters and mediates 
what law means through a risk-based logic (Talesh 2015b, 2018).  This risk-based frame 
penetrates the way formal legal institutions such as courts operate and provides a framework for 
insurers to regulate behavior in society often in areas where the government remains silent.  
Moreover, risk management principles derived from the insurance field mediate the meaning of 
law for organizations often tasked with complying with law.  Consistent with the New Legal 
Realist tradition, I use empirical research to show how insurance institutions act as an 
intermediary and translates what law means in society.   
To make this argument, I show how insurance and more broadly, risk influence the legal 
environment.  I define the legal environment to include formal legal institutions such as courts, 
legislatures, and regulatory institutions, as well as the actors that encounter legal institutions such 
as judges, regulators, lawyers and organizations.  Insurance is also an ideological construct that 
influences the relationship between law and regulation, such that much of society is governed 
through risk, both within the boundaries of insurance but even beyond insurance.  In doing so, 
insurance institutions acting as intermediaries can at times inhibit individuals access to justice 
while also facilitating the achievement of public benefits. 
I begin by explaining how insurance exerts a regulatory force over its subjects and acts as 
a form of governance beyond the state.  Next, I show how the presence of liability insurance 
often shapes how civil lawsuits are structured.  I then pivot to the criminal justice system where 
risk assessment and actuarial techniques increasingly are used to categorize criminals with 
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varying degrees of dangerousness.  I then show how risk management now permeates and 
influences how many judges operate in various problem-solving courts.  Finally, I reveal the 
processes and mechanisms through which insurer risk management techniques influence how 
organizations understand law and compliance.  I conclude this chapter by noting that the 
insurance field’s shaping of law can have both positive and negative impacts for achieving 
access to justice.  Insurer regulatory and legal interventions may improve compliant behavior by 
businesses and individuals, but may also decouple law from the goals of particular legislative or 
regulatory frameworks and weaken the meaning of law in action.  
INSURANCE INSTITUTIONS AS REGULATORY ACTORS 
Insurance institutions, forms, technologies, and visions (Ewald 1991) act as a form of 
governance beyond the state (Ericson, Doyle, and Barry 2003; Ericson and Doyle 2004).  While 
public legal institutions establish formal laws and regulations in most societies, insurance 
institutions (1) reshape the state, through a redefinition of its limits, its responsibilities, and 
mission; and (2) act as disciplining instruments, particularly in the way they shape behavior and 
expectations.  This is especially true since most laws are not specific with respect to how to 
comply with them and there are under and unregulated parts of society.  Moreover, governments 
across the world are incapable of regulating every facet of social life. The following focuses on 
how the insurance field, using a risk-based logic, influences legal institutions such as courts and 
regulatory institutions and the nature of law and compliance.  Insurance acts as a gatekeeper and 
a form of governance of individual and organizational behavior.   
Insurance as Gatekeeper 
Insurance serves a gatekeeping function in society because it is a prerequisite to other 
activity.  Generally, a person cannot register an automobile without automobile insurance, obtain 
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a commercial business loan without business owners’ insurance, bid on a government contract 
without a surety bond, obtain practice privileges at hospitals without medical malpractice 
insurance, and sign a commercial lease without commercial property and liability insurance 
(Baker 2010).   
Homeownership in the United States quite clearly illustrates the gatekeeping function 
insurance plays.  Homeownership is traditionally considered one of the fundamental features of 
the American economy.  Thus, the availability of mortgages at a reasonable and affordable rate is 
often regarded as an important economic indicator.  However, homeowners’ insurance plays an 
important role in the availability of mortgages, because one cannot take out a mortgage without 
homeowners’ insurance.  In particular, obtaining homeowners’ insurance is mandatory for 
standard mortgages and homeowners’ insurers often use their own underwriting concerns that are 
independent from the screening procedures implemented by the lender (Squires 1997).   
Insurance as Governance 
Insurance is an institutional force that effects individuals, organizations, and institutions 
inside and outside the insurance industry (Ericson, Doyle, and Barry 2003).  Insurance 
simultaneously produces knowledge of risk, creates a scheme from which risks can be made 
objectively calculable, and develops a risk pool.  Risk is a socially constructed concept. Through 
actuarial techniques, concrete facts about objective risks are converted into probabilities and 
ultimately assigned a cost so that prices can be established.  Actuarialism creates a risk pool, that 
is, a population that has a stake in the identified risks and the specific harms they entail. The risk 
pool transforms the population into a collective that seeks to minimize loss while also 
compensating those who suffer a loss.  Insurance manages risks in the population by using 
oversight, surveillance, and auditing while also making its risk pool subject to contract and 
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ultimately adjudication.   But insurance also assists the law in assigning liability to the party 
most capable of distributing the loss through insurance.  Consistent with the idea that risk is a 
technique for constructing social reality, Ericson, Doyle, and Barry observe that “insurance is a 
social technology of justice.  It bridges individual and social responsibility through distributive 
justice (collective sharing of loss) and restorative justice (financial indemnification)”. For that 
reason, they contend, “insurance is … political, combining aspects of collective well-being and 
individual liberty in a state of perpetual tension” (Ericson, Doyle, and Barry 2003, 6). 
Scholars adopting an insurance-as-governance framework emphasize the way in which 
private insurers and governments exercise similar power in society and behave in a similar 
manner.  In particular, the private insurance industry has many of the same goals as the state, 
including seeking forms of social security and solidarity by pooling risks.  The private insurance 
industry provides technologies and social arrangements for allocating risk across pools of risk 
takers and provides for a sharing of the risks of misfortune through financial compensation of 
loss.  It also attempts to establish preventative security arrangements that try to minimize harm 
and loss to its citizens.  Thus, the private insurance industry governs through its powers to 
transfer and distribute risk, and it engages and involves the state only when necessary.   The 
private insurance industry also uses many of the same methods as the state to achieve its goals 
such as surveillance, underwriting (sophisticated information systems for selecting risks), and 
claims (compensating loss).  It also uses a substantial amount of private policing in the form of 
technologies, investigators, and inspectors to address fraud and achieve loss reduction and 
preventative security.  Similar to the state, the private insurance industry is subject to many 
social, economic, and political forces such as changes to the environment, economic 
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globalization, terrorism, property and violent crime, and advances in medicine and health.  The 
private insurance industry partners with the state to regulate insurance practices.   
More recently, there has been an effort in the past twenty years toward both theorizing 
and empirically exploring how the private insurance industry plays an active role in constructing 
the meaning of risk and responsibility in different segments of society (Talesh 2015b).  Notable 
governance-as-insurance studies include:  studying the role of property insurers in governing 
security in the home (O’Malley 1991), exploring how insurers manage moral hazard in property 
and fidelity insurance relationships (Heimer 1985), highlighting the governance role of insurance 
companies in the motion picture industry in the United States (Hubbart 1996-97), analyzing the 
rise of risk management approaches toward campus drinking (Simon 1994), and examining the 
tort-settlement factoring industry in the United States (Scales 2002).   
In sum, the private insurance industry acts as a regulator and more broadly, as a system of 
governance through various forms of collaboration with state governments: “sharing similar 
goals of security and solidarity through the pooling of risks; using similar techniques for 
governing at a distance; and collaborating in insurance regimes” (Ericson, Doyle, and Barry 
2003, 65).  Insurance institutions are not just pooling and transferring risk, but instead actively 
shaping the world within which they operate.  Insurance policies act as discipline instruments 
and de facto regulators over people and organizations.  As these examples highlight, under a 
governance conception, insurance does not fit well within a public-private dichotomy.  The 
relationship between insurers and policyholders falls somewhere in between the relationship 
between a public government and its citizens and a private relationship between two parties to a 
contract.  However, private insurers are not agents of government; they are not subject to the 
rules, policies and procedures that limit government discretion.  Moreover, they are not required 
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to afford policyholders constitutional protections such as due process or equal protection 
(Abraham 2010).  As the private insurance industry’s governance role continues to grow, 
scholars going forward may want to consider standards for regulating the behavior of private 
insurers beyond those contained in administrative regulations, civil law doctrines, and contract 
law doctrines.   
LIABILITY INSURANCE AS THE PRIMARY FUNDING MECHANISM FOR THE CIVIL  
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
In addition to acting as a governing mechanism and a gatekeeper, insurance shapes our 
civil legal system.  For example, liability insurance acts as a form of tort regulation and in doing 
so, finances the civil litigation system.  Tort law in action is often shaped by the absence or 
presence of liability insurance.  Over the past century, tort law has continually sought available 
sources of recovery and often creates and expands the liability of individuals and businesses that 
are likely to be covered by or have access to liability insurance (Abraham 2008). As tort law 
expands, so does liability insurance.   
For example, medical liability insurance grew with medical liability and became so 
intertwined with it that occasional medical liability insurance crises are widely interpreted as 
medical liability crises (Baker 2005a).  Product liability doctrine has been facilitated by product 
liability insurance.  Insurance companies responded by creating new forms of liability insurance 
to address the new liabilities when existing insurance was not available. Employment liability 
insurance rose as employment liability grew in the late nineteenth century.  Moreover, state 
workers’ compensation statutes enacted in the early twentieth century addressed the rising 
number of work-related accidents and the fact that the litigation system was unpredictable, 
expensive, filled with delays, and often led to small recoveries for people with work-related 
injuries. Workers’ compensation laws allowed individuals suffering work-related injuries to 
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receive compensation relatively quickly and without needing to obtain a lawyer and establish tort 
liability (Friedman and Ladinsky 1967; Talesh 2012a).  Even the United States government took 
steps after the terrorist attack of 9/11/01 to design a first-party liability insurance scheme, to 
compensate victims’ families who otherwise would have had to use the tort system to seek relief.  
The compensation fund established by British Petroleum in response to the oil spill that occurred 
in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 provides a more recent example of how insurance-based principles 
are used to pre-empt tort liability.  The rise of data breach and cyber security attacks has led to 
the emergence of cyber insurance (Talesh 2018). 
Because of consumer debt and the ability of bankruptcy courts to discharge civil 
liabilities, liability insurance is the primary asset on which plaintiffs can count when seeking to 
collect tort judgments.  Without liability insurance, many underserved individuals who were 
innocently injured as the result of a tort by another person would not be compensated through 
civil litigation. Liability insurance-in-action means that when an injured victim brings a tort 
claim against a tortfeasor, it is the liability insurer that often defends the claim and, if necessary, 
pays the claim (Gross and Syverud 1996).  The presence of liability insurance consequently 
shapes how plaintiffs and defense lawyers litigate cases (Yeazell 2001).  A plaintiff lawyer’s 
decision to represent an injured victim in a tort case is predicated not merely on proving the 
elements of a tort, but on the defendant’s ability to pay (Baker 2005b).  Liability insurance 
determines who can be sued, for how much, and for what wrongs.  For individuals bringing tort-
based lawsuits, “liability insurance is a de facto element of tort law, [and a] de facto cap on tort 
damages” (Baker 2005b, 13).  Even large corporations with significant assets often have liability 
insurance, but this relationship does not necessarily make litigation more efficient; large 
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corporations involved in tort lawsuits often spend a significant amount of time convincing their 
own insurance companies to pay (Baker & Griffith 2010).  
In one of the early but influential studies of the gap between the law on the books and the 
law in action, Ross’s (1970) study of automobile insurance adjustors in the late 1960s revealed 
how liability insurance led insurance claims administrators to focus on interpreting and 
implementing tort law by primarily managing aggregate costs rather than determining the 
individual fault of defendants (Ross 1970).  Thus, under Ross’s study, liability insurance is a 
bureaucratic claim processing mechanism that renders large amounts of tort law into a simple, 
manageable set of compensation rules and procedures.  Although Ross focused on automobile 
claims, others have demonstrated how tort claiming is highly connected to liability insurance in a 
number of other tort subfields (Abraham 2008; Abraham and Liebman 1993; Baker 2005a; 
Vidmar et al. 2005; Baker & Griffith 2010).   
In sum, insurance does not just cast a shadow over the regulatory state, but influences 
lawyer behavior and finances the civil justice system.  Risk, risk shifting, risk pooling, and risk 
reduction drive insurance influence in legal domains. 
Risk and Actuarial Thinking Shapes the Criminal Justice System 
While insurance operates in the shadow of the civil justice system and drives litigation 
decisionmaking and access to compensable relief for injuries, risk and risk assessment drives the 
criminal justice system.  Jonathan Simon and Malcolm Feeley’s “New Penology” argued that in 
the late twentieth century, a new model for managing dangerous persons emerged that relied 
heavily on statistical factors and actuarial methods of risk assessment (Feeley and Simon 1992).   
The new penology focused on managing the risk of group populations and replaced the 
old model of individual moral culpability, clinical diagnosis, intervention, treatment, and 
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retributive judgment.  As a result, rehabilitation was replaced with managing career criminals 
and minimizing risk.  In contrast to the correctional continuum of the 1960s and 1970s, “this new 
custodial continuum does not design penal measures for the particular needs of the individual or 
the community.  Instead, it sorts individuals into groups according to the degree of control 
warranted by their risk profiles” (Feeley and Simon 1992, 459).  Rather than relying on 
externally imposed social goals, such as public safety or inmate reintegration, criminal justice 
institutions in the new penology use internal system measures as evaluative performance 
indicators.  The new penology and a focus on risk assessment sought to regulate levels of 
deviance, not intervene or respond to individual deviants or larger social or structural problems.  
Feeley and Simon’s actuarial paradigm reflects a shift in penal theory and a disturbing trend in 
criminal justice systems’ management of dangerous populations: “the optimism of the 
rehabilitative ideal that had played such an important role in 18th, 19th, and mid-20th century 
penology has been replaced by a pragmatic pessimism about the possibility of transformation” 
(Winick 2000, 59, n. 132 FN 134).  In sum, taken collectively, risk and insurance principles 
penetrate civil and criminal justice systems in powerful ways. 
Judges as “Dynamic Risk Managers” in Problem Solving Courts  
As the prior sections show, risk and risk management shape regulatory behavior and the 
criminal and civil litigation systems.  Insurance as a financier of the civil justice system and the 
new penology in the criminal context directly impact lawyer behavior and decisionmaking. 
Insurance and risk considerations impact whether attorneys take on cases and settle them in the 
civil context or plea bargain in the criminal context.   
But judicial decisionmaking, especially in criminal cases, is also increasingly governed 
and influenced by risk management principles.  For example, problem solving courts, including 
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but not limited to, mental health, family, drug, domestic violence, juvenile, juvenile mental 
health, homeless, and community courts, are emerging across the country as viable alternatives 
to the traditional criminal process.  In these courts, judges do not simply adjudicate cases, but 
tackle underlying social issues that led the offender to incarceration, while simultaneously 
diverting the offender out of traditional criminal court. Simply put, these interventionist courts 
within the criminal justice system seek to link defendants with long-term treatment as an 
alternative to incarceration.  In addition to diverting criminal offenders from the normal criminal 
process, these courts attempt to address the underlying problems that often result in the 
incarceration of criminal offenders.  Through treatment, supervision, and social services, 
problem solving courts try to shift the focus from evaluating blameworthiness to changing the 
future behavior of defendants in order to avoid recidivism.  Working with many different 
stakeholders that act as intermediaries, the judge oversees the problem solving approach.   
My prior empirical work on mental health courts suggests problem solving court judges 
act as dynamic risk managers.  Rather than simply processing cases and perpetuating the 
revolving door, judges manage risk, attempt to resolve the underlying problem, and attempt to 
heal the defendant.  With the assistance of team members—including the public defender, 
prosecutor, and other behavioral specialists—the judge performs the following three tasks: (1) 
she conducts a risk assessment in order to evaluate the defendant’s potential to harm himself and 
the public; (2) she evaluates and implements a treatment plan designed to manage and reallocate 
the defendant’s risk; and (3) she monitors the risk over a period of time, often requiring frequent 
return visits by the defendant (Talesh 2007).  When managing risk, mental health court judges 
function as hybrid social workers (diagnosing and implementing a plan) and probation officers 
(monitoring the offender to ensure compliance).  When functioning in its ideal form, the 
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collaborative, team-oriented approach of mental health courts shifts the focus of the criminal 
process toward healing and away from punishment.  Although risk management techniques may 
have always been embedded in judges’ roles, these techniques are now becoming more overtly a 
part of the judicial routine.   
 There is some evidence to suggest that the new penology concerns raised by Simon and 
Feeley are less pervasive in the risk management approach employed by problem solving court 
judges.  For example, mental health court judges focus on each individual in an attempt to divert, 
treat, and reintegrate them while minimizing future criminality and potential harm to others. The 
risk management approach is adjustable, individualized, and does not merely sort dangerous 
people into groups in order to incapacitate them.  The variety of approaches judges use are all 
calibrated to the specific risk presented.  Judges try to make decisions about proper interventions, 
monitoring, and supervision of each individual offender and focus on healing the specific 
individual.  In fact, the assessment of dangerousness is not heavily dependent upon actuarial 
models, but instead relies on clinical predictions that are continuously updated and adjusted 
based on the defendant’s decreasing or increasing level of risk.  Thus, when functioning 
properly, mental health courts appear closer to an older medical model than the punitive model 
currently in place because they focus on healing and intervention as opposed to incapacitation.  
Nonetheless, whether discussing perceived dangerous criminals or more low-level criminals that 
find their way into problem solving courts, both rely on risk as an assessment tool.   
INSURERS AS INTERMEDIARIES SHAPE THE MEANING OF LAW AND COMPLIANCE 
Thus far, I have discussed formal interventions and influences on public legal institutions.  
Insurance and more broadly risk act as a governance mechanism and regulator for society, 
impact the civil and criminal justice legal systems, and the role of judges.  Civil and criminal 
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litigants’ access to justice is mediated through insurance and risk management principles.  
However, risk, risk management, and insurance often occupy a space between the law on the 
books and the law in action.  Insurer intervention in society as a de facto regulator goes beyond 
mere policy language.   
Scholars are also increasingly focusing on how rule or legal intermediaries shape 
organizational construction of law (Edelman 2016; Edelman & Talesh 2011; Talesh 2015a).  
Rule or legal intermediaries are state, business, and civil society actors that affect, control or 
monitor how legal rules are interpreted, implemented, or constructed. Legal intermediaries 
influence the way organizations understand law and compliance by filtering what law means 
through non-legal logics emanating from various organizational fields (Talesh & Pelisse 2019).  
Because laws regulating organizations are often ambiguous with respect to how to comply and 
government oversight is often lacking in significant areas due to resource constraints and lack of 
political will, the insurance field, including but not limited to insurance companies, brokers, 
agents, administrators, risk managers, act as intermediaries with varying degrees of success.  
Insurance companies as intermediaries often influence how organizations understand law and 
compliance and shape the meaning of laws designed to regulate various organizations. More 
recently, scholars are increasingly examining how the processes and mechanisms through which 
insurers act as intermediaries between what formal laws state and how organizations should go 
about complying with such laws.  The following briefly highlights a few case studies that 
demonstrate insurers as intermediaries is very much a mixed bag.  
Cyber Insurers as Compliance Managers 
Cybersecurity risks (i.e., “loss exposure associated with the use of electronic equipment, 
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computers, information technology, and virtual reality”) are among the biggest new threats 
facing businesses and most consumers.  Data breach events cause financial and public relations 
damage and threaten an organization’s survival.  Organizations also face compliance challenges 
as they are forced to navigate between the various federal and state laws and regulations 
concerning the collection and use of personal data.  Despite these threats, prevailing empirical 
research suggests private organizations are not significantly changing their behavior.  Although 
many organizations do have formal policies in place, the majority of organizations do not believe 
that they are sufficiently prepared for a data breach, do not devote adequate money, training, and 
resources toward protecting consumer’s electronic information from data breaches, and fail to 
perform proper risk assessments (Talesh 2018).   
Recognizing this under-preparation and under-compliance gap, the insurance field 
stepped in and, in the last decade, began offering cyber insurance.  Cyber insurance is insurance 
designed to provide both first-party loss and third-party liability coverage for data breach events, 
privacy violations, and cyberattacks.  Although there is variation in the types of policies being 
offered, insurers offering cyber insurance provide some risk shifting for the costs associated with 
having to respond, investigate, defend, and mitigate against the consequences surrounding a data 
breach event, cyberattack, and privacy violations. Organizations are increasingly purchasing 
cyber insurance to deal these new risks. 
Insurance companies and institutions, through cyber liability insurance, do not simply 
pool and transfer an insured’s risk to an insurance company or provide defense and 
indemnification services to an insured.  In addition to transferring risk, my empirical research 
suggests that cyber insurance provides a series of risk management services that actively shape 
the way an organization’s various departments tasked with dealing with data breach, such as in-
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house counsel, information technology, compliance, public relations, and other organizational 
units, respond to data breach.  Cyber insurers are acting as compliance managers and trying to 
prevent, detect, and respond to data breaches.  They also try to help organizations comply with 
various privacy laws.  Thus, cyber insurers frame the legal environment in terms of risk and then 
encourage corporations to use their risk management services to avoid data breaches and privacy 
law violations (Talesh 2018). 
In doing so, insurers absorb many of the responsibilities of an organization’s information 
technology department with risk management services that they offer and try to prevent and 
detect data breaches before they occur (Talesh 2018).  Many of the issues that arise during a data 
breach that are often handled by internal departments within an organization, such as legal, 
compliance, information technology and public relations/crisis management, are now being 
assisted and guided by insurance industry professionals or third-party vendors that insurance 
companies offer to assist organizations at a reduced fee.  Cyber insurance provides a pathway for 
insurance institutions to act as external compliance monitors and managers of organizational 
behavior with respect to data theft.  Given the under-preparation and under-compliance by 
businesses, institutionalized risk management techniques developed within the insurance field 
can potentially improve organizational practices and compliance concerning data breach. 
Cyber insurers engage in risk and loss prevention on behalf of the organizations that 
purchase their insurance and absorb many of the functions of the organizations in terms of 
preventing risks.  Risk prevention takes a series of forms, including conducting cyber health 
checks and audits that evaluate the kinds of cyber security practices that the organization is 
maintaining. Risk prevention tools and security ratings act as a disciplinary instrument over 
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organizations.  The scans and health checks are sometimes used as a precondition for 
determining whether a potential company is eligible for cyber insurance.   
Insurers construct the meaning of compliance through a series of written value-added 
services that focus on advising organizations on how to prevent and detect data breaches. Cyber 
insurers also evaluate an organization’s written policies and advise organizations on how to 
avoid fines and liability for data breach.  In particular, these written audits focus on interpreting 
privacy laws and preventing breaches that lead to regulatory fines. In this respect, insurers are 
shaping the way that private organizations comply with privacy law challenges on the ground. 
Insurers also provide access to services aimed at responding to, investigating, defending, 
and mitigating against the consequences surrounding a data breach event or privacy law 
violation. Insurers contract with third-party vendors that the insured can use or have 
departmental units that deal with various cyber-related problems. Typically, the insured receives 
a reduced premium to use the insurer’s vendors.  Cyber insurers are providing risk response well 
beyond the scope of what insurers typically handle. 
Insurers provide organizations access to a designated panel of lawyers and law firms that 
can assist in managing the legal issues that arise when a data breach occurs. Cyber insurers or 
their third-party vendors also provide organizations access to and coverage for forensic cyber 
security experts.  These experts help organizations identify the source and cause of the data 
breach, contain the breach, and ultimately restore the network processes that may have been 
damaged as a result of the breach.  Cyber insurers offer a series of preapproved public relations 
and crisis management firms that the insured can retain at a reduced premium.  These firms 
provide advertising or related communications to protect and restore the insured’s reputation 
following a breach event.  When evaluating the totality of services that the insurers offer 
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organizations, such as the legal services, forensics, and crisis management, insurers can be 
viewed as managers and quasi-regulators of cyber security risks.  Whether insurer interventions 
improve organizations’ data security is an open question.  Future research in this area should 
evaluate the degree that insurer regulatory interventions lead to improved compliance with 
privacy law and enhanced data security. 
Directors and Officers As Neglectful Intermediaries 
Despite the obvious financial incentives insurers have for getting involved in the cyber 
security risk management market, the cyber insurance example highlights how insurer risk 
management services can potentially help curb the under-compliance and under-preparation gaps 
that organizations encounter when dealing with cyber threats.  In particular, insurance company 
interventions aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to cyber threats simultaneously 
assist the regulated entities—organizations who do not want to experience a data breach—but 
also help consumers—who do not want their private information compromised.  Although 
certainly not perfect, insurance institutions nudge corporations toward protecting client and 
customer data. 
Insurance companies do not, however, always have positive outcomes as corporate 
regulators.  For example, insurance companies offering directors’ and officers’ liability insurance 
are not always effective substitutes as regulatory intermediaries.  In particular, direct litigation by 
shareholders is an important regulatory mechanism over U.S. corporations.  Broadly, 
“shareholder litigation” refers to all civil actions brought by current or former shareholders of a 
corporation against the corporation or its managers for losses the shareholders suffer as a result 
of actions taken by the corporation and its managers.  In response to the very real threat of 
shareholder litigation, officers and directors of corporate entities often obtain Directors’ and 
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Officers’ Liability Insurance (D&O insurance).  This insurance protects officers and directors 
from personal liability in the event of shareholder litigation. Moreover, D&O insurance also 
protects the corporation itself from liability it may have in connection with shareholder litigation.  
D&O insurance transfers the obligations of the prospective bad actor (officer, director, or 
corporation itself) to an insurer which pays for defense and indemnification. Thus, one concern is 
that D&O insurance potentially decreases the deterrence function of shareholder litigation by 
making it easier for directors and officers to pass these risks and responsibilities to the insurance 
company. 
By offering D&O insurance, however, insurers act as a third-party intermediary in the 
regulatory scheme.  In this situation, directors’ and officers’ insurers have a great opportunity to 
influence corporate conduct through the insurance relationship (underwriting, monitoring and the 
settlement of claims) and potentially help directors and officers avoid shareholder litigation.  
Successful oversight of directors and officer behavior and conduct would preserve shareholder 
litigation as a regulatory device and encourage corporate actors to engage in compliant behavior.   
However, empirical research suggests that D&O insurers rarely discourage wrongful and 
even illegal behavior of directors and officers (Baker and Griffith 2010). Lack of intermediary 
intervention by insurers significantly weakens the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation and 
thus undermines the potential for these lawsuits to act as forms of regulation (Baker and Griffith 
2010).  Despite having financial incentives to do so, empirical research suggests D&O insurers 
neither monitor nor provide loss prevention programs to the corporations they insure. In 
particular, D&O insurers do not condition the sale of insurance on adopting loss-prevention 
policies (Baker and Griffith 2010).  Moreover, brokers and risk managers note that loss 
prevention advice was not very valued or binding on public corporations. Equally important, 
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insurers rarely try to influence or change corporate behavior or condition insurance coverage on 
adopting what insurers might consider good corporate governance standards.  The D&O 
insurance example highlights an example of how insurer risk management does not induce 
positive regulatory outcomes. 
Employment Practice Liability Insurance –Framing Law As Risk 
Whereas D&O insurers had opportunities to engage in loss prevention and discourage 
wrongful or even illegal conduct but failed to do so, employment practice liability insurers do 
offer risk management and loss prevention advice but do so in a way that often weakens the 
meaning of anti-discrimination law and reframes anti-discrimination law around a focus on risk 
and litigation avoidance. 
 The rise of Employment Practice Liability Insurance (EPLI) illustrates how insurance 
institutions mediate the meaning of compliance with civil rights legislation and how these 
constructions of compliance end up being deferred to and legitimated by public legal institutions.   
In response to perceived threats of employment discrimination and harassment lawsuits, 
insurance companies began offering EPLI.  Unlike prior forms of business insurance that 
expressly excludes coverage for liability arising out of employment practices, EPLI policies 
provide insurance defense and indemnification coverage to employers for claims of 
discrimination (e.g., age, sex, race, disability) and other employment-related allegations made by 
employees, former employees, or potential employees. 
 Insurers increasingly offer EPLI and employers increasingly purchase this insurance.  
Whereas only a few insurance companies in the 1990s offered EPLI, now over seventy insurance 
companies offer EPLI and many large employers purchase EPLI.  Insurers play a role in averting 
such risk and act as a regulatory intermediary because employers have an incentive to avoid 
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discrimination; however, insurers do so in a way that focuses on avoiding litigation rather than 
fostering a discrimination-free work environment. 
 Specifically, my fieldwork revealed how the insurance field (insurance companies, 
agents, brokers, and risk management consultants), through EPLI and the accompanying risk 
management services that the field offers, construct the threat of employment law and influence 
the nature of civil rights compliance (Talesh 2015a). Drawing from participant observation and 
interviews at EPLI conferences across the country as well as content analysis of EPLI policies, 
loss-prevention manuals, EPLI industry guidelines, and webinars, my empirical data suggest that 
insurance companies and institutions use a risk-based logic and institutionalize a way of thinking 
centered on risk management and reduction.  Faced with uncertain and unpredictable legal risk 
concerning potential discrimination violations, insurance institutions elevate the risk and threat in 
the legal environment and offer a series of risk-management services that they argue will avert 
risk for employers that purchase EPLI. By framing employers’ legal environment in terms of 
uncertain legal risk,2 heightened litigation risk,3 and the need for risk reduction,4 the insurance 
                                                          
2  Uncertain legal risk refers to the risk of loss to an organization based on some violation of law.  
My empirical research reveals that insurers frame employers’ legal risk as uncertain, vague, and 
unpredictable (Talesh 2015a).  
3  Insurance field actors heighten the litigation risk facing employers by routinely discussing the 
growth, burden, and cost of employment lawsuits in documentary data and webinars (Talesh 
2015a). 
4  Once the insurance field frames the legal risks facing employers as uncertain but elevated and 
likely to occur, the insurance field encourages employers and risk management consultants to 
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industry creates a space to encourage employers to engage in managerialized responses and 
develop formalized policies and procedures by using the various risk-management services 
offered by insurers to help reduce these risks.  Insurers encourage employers to purchase EPLI 
because these insurance policies and the value-added risk management services that insurers 
offer will reduce employers’ risk.  In particular, EPLI insurers offer a variety of risk-
management services to employers that try to provide a regulatory check on employer 
discriminatory practices.   
Whereas insurers in the privacy context focus less on interpreting or influencing the 
meaning of privacy law, EPLI insurers influence the meaning of compliance with anti-
discrimination laws in a number of ways.  First, conferences, training programs, loss-prevention 
manuals, and insurance policy language provide an opportunity for the insurance field actors to 
build discretion into legal rules.  In other words, insurance companies develop policy language, 
which provides work-arounds to certain legal rules clearly forbidding insurance coverage for 
certain acts or omissions in civil rights contexts (Talesh 2015a). 
Second, insurance companies also reframe legal rules and principles around a nonlegal 
risk logic that focuses on averting risk and making discrimination claims against employers more 
defensible.  For example, U.S. Supreme Court decisions are framed by insurance field actors at 
conferences that insurers and employers attend around shifting risk and avoiding liability.  Thus, 
unlike the directors and officer context where insurers miss opportunities to engage in insurance 
loss prevention, insurers do engage in loss prevention, but do so in a manner that is filtered by 
                                                          
avert or reduce this risk by purchasing EPLI insurance and various risk-management services 
(Talesh 2015a). 
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risk-management logics.  Law is viewed and understood as risk.  While my data suggest EPLI 
and the series of risk-management services offered with the insurance policy can potentially 
improve employment practices and compliance, they also suggest that EPLI risk-management 
services may at times shape compliance in a way that leans more toward making claims 
defensible rather than fostering a discrimination-free workplace.  Despite the questionable 
regulatory results emanating from insurers as risk managers in the employment context, public 
legal institutions such as courts, legislatures, and regulatory institutions afford EPLI considerable 
deference by authorizing, requiring, or encouraging public institutions to purchase EPLI and use 
the risk-management services that insurers offer.  In doing so, I extend legal endogeneity theory 
into the insurance context and show how in this instance, risk and managerial values work in a 
complimentary way to shape the meaning of anti-discrimination law (2015a). 
In sum, the content and meaning of law and regulatory policy in this instance is 
determined by private organizations, such as insurance companies.  This research extends and 
refines theories of legal endogeneity in important ways.  In this instance, the insurance field 
maintains a conception of employment law filtered through managerial and risk values, which 
highlights the enhancement of employers’ formal structures that demonstrate compliance and 
rational governance.  The insurance industry communicates and markets this vision by 
highlighting the risk of not developing policies and procedures, as well as by providing a 
protective net for employers in the form of EPLI insurance coverage.  The government adopts 
this conception into its policies by encouraging, authorizing, and sometimes requiring 
governmental institutions to purchase EPLI and the accompanying risk management services.  
Thus, legal mandates requiring organizations to purchase EPLI look like they emanate from 
public legal institutions, such as courts, legislatures, and regulatory institutions, but in reality the 
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mandates are generated from the insurance field’s responses to employment laws. 
Taken together, these case studies reflect a more recent turn toward research directed at 
looking at how insurance institutions construct the meaning of law and compliance for 
organizations.  As these cyber, D & O, and EPLI studies suggest, organizations across the world 
are turning to intermediaries, such as insurance companies, to assist with complying with the vast 
array of laws and regulations.   Scholars have explored the relationship between loss prevention 
and policyholder moral hazard across a variety of domains including legal malpractice (Cohen 
1997), medical malpractice (Baker 2005a), motion pictures (Hubbart 1997), and most recently 
policing (Rappaport 2017).  Thus, across a variety of areas, insurers regulate corporations.  These 
studies that focus on how insurance companies tangibly act as risk regulators reveal that 
insurance and risk management as a regulatory and legal tool should be viewed on a continuum.  
Acting as intermediaries, insurers are capable of nudging organizations to normatively 
appropriate behavior, but also ripe with potentially problematic and harmful consequences for 
access to justice and society more broadly.   
CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the NLR tradition, this chapter demonstrates law in society is 
increasingly shaped by non-legal institutions. I focus not just on the bottom up or top down 
constructions of law but the way that legal intermediaries work in between this space and play a 
major role in interpreting, translating, and constructing law in society in ways that at times 
facilitate and inhibit access to justice.  Drawing from new institutional studies of law and 
organizations, this chapter demonstrates how insurance and more broadly, the organizations and 
actors that make up the insurance field, and the dominant logic operating in that field (risk), 
influence law and legal institutions.  Risk is a template through which we govern.  Insurance and 
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the insurance field more broadly, anchored in a logic of risk, reshape the state, act as disciplining 
instruments for individual and collective behavior, and often influence how we conceptualize 
fairness and deliver justice in society.  Law plays a pivotal role in each of these transformations.  
But the insurance field is shaping law and legal institutions each step of the way.   
Insurance policy language acts as a regulatory force and shapes the structure of the civil 
justice system.  In this way, insurance institutions as intermediaries facilitate and inhibit access 
to justice in society.  More broadly, conceptions of risk influence criminal courts’ assessment of 
defendants in traditional and problem-solving criminal courts.  Thus, the insurance field’s logic 
of risk goes well beyond the insurance industry or insurance products and services, but impacts 
how key legal actors and institutions operate in society.  Insurance influences society not just by 
policy language, but by a myriad of risk management services offered when purchasing 
insurance.  Here, insurers are not simply pooling or spreading risk or providing litigation defense 
costs and indemnification, but are attempting to influence the nature of compliance in 
organizations.   
The empirical turn towards studying the processes and mechanisms through which 
insurers act as risk regulators and intermediaries is significant.  Focusing on the forms and 
functions of insurance and analyzing the conditions under which insurance companies impact 
society are crucial.  However, more recent empirical explorations of insurer risk management 
that are also highlighted in this chapter focus on the processes through which insurance 
institutions construct the meaning of compliance and law.  Insurance as regulation is not just 
about deterrence, moral hazard, and loss prevention focus.  The fact that the insurance field 
transforms the moral logic of anti-discrimination law through a risk management filter 
demonstrates that the insurance-as-regulation narrative is not simply one of assessing how well 
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liability insurance delivers law’s deterrence signal.  Rather, insurance as regulation is also a story 
of how insurance organizations transform that deterrence signal.   
This chapter explores what governing through risk looks like as society increasingly 
gravitates toward thinking about legal problems from a lens of risk. Because there is variation in 
the extent to which insurer risk management and compliance programs embrace or neglect 
formal adherence to privacy, corporate, and employment laws, future studies should examine 
under what conditions insurers, in their capacity as risk managers, facilitate or inhibit corporate 
social responsibility and the goals of regulation.  Preliminarily, we see that insurer risk 
management services and intermediary interventions in organizations may reflect some best 
practices, lead to improved written policies and procedures, promote a better work culture, and 
induce greater compliance with law. Thus, there is a potential positive role for insurers to play.  
This is especially important since public legal institutions are incapable of regulating every 
aspect of society.  To the extent insurers can induce lawful and normatively appropriate behavior 
by individuals and organizations, there is a net benefit for society. 
On the other hand, insurer risk management services make it easier for organizations to 
develop policies and procedures without actively drafting them.  Insurers may decouple or shift 
responsibility for hard normative judgments away from organizations.  In doing so, organizations 
will not be as responsible for making moral, ethical, and legal choices involved with compliance.  
Also, insurance company guidance on these issues sometimes focuses on how to avoid litigation 
as opposed to providing steps to build a more legally compliant business environment.  
Regardless of one’s normative position on the insurance field’s influence on society, 
insurance influence is here to stay and is growing.  To the extent risk is a template through which 
we govern society and that insurance and risk principles are influencing law and legal 
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institutions, scholars interested in the study of insurance should explore the insurance field’s 
influence on law and how insurer risk management techniques facilitate or inhibit inequality in 
society and transform organizational and individual behavior and expectations. 
I have used the insurance field as a pathway to not just exploring how insurers shape law 
and influence access to justice in civil and criminal settings, but also to explore the value of 
doing such an analysis using an NLR framework. In particular, the research drawn upon in this 
chapter is multi- and interdisciplinary, theoretically-informed research that translates social 
science for lawyers.  In particular, NLR takes seriously the interplay between formal legal 
institutions and law-in-action.  Most importantly, this interplay is mediated by legal 
intermediaries such as the insurance field.  We hope scholars doing empirical work on law—
whether social scientists or law professors—will pay particular attention to the role that legal 
intermediaries play in how law is constructed, interpreted, and implemented in everyday life.  
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